Recent Developments by Hillhouse, Raelynn J.
Arkansas Law Review
Volume 72 | Number 1 Article 9
July 2019
Recent Developments
Raelynn J. Hillhouse
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Dispute Resolution and
Arbitration Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Law Enforcement and
Corrections Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Arkansas Law Review by an
authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact ccmiddle@uark.edu.
Recommended Citation
Raelynn J. Hillhouse, Recent Developments, 72 Ark. L. Rev. 299 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr/vol72/iss1/9
Recent Developments 
BUCKLEW V. PRECYTHE 
A prisoner sought to prevent his execution by the state of 
Missouri in an applied challenge, arguing that Missouri’s method 
of implementation of the death penalty would present him with a 
substantial risk of severe pain due to his unique medical 
condition, and, thus, would violate the Eighth Amendment.  A 
plurality of the Court clarified that the Baze and Glossip test 
governs all Eight Amendment death penalty challenges.1  Under 
the Baze and Glossip test, “a prisoner must show a feasible and 
readily implemented alternative method of execution that would 
significantly reduce a substantial risk of sever pain and that the 
State has refused to adopt without a legitimate penological 
reason.”2  The plurality reaffirmed that the prohibition on cruel 
and unusual punishment “does not guarantee a prisoner a painless 
death.”3 
MADISON V. ALABAMA 
An Alabama death-row inmate challenged his execution on 
grounds his vascular dementia precluded him from understanding 
the rationale for his execution, and, thus, violate the Eighth 
Amendment.  The inmate argued that Panetti v. Quarterman 
which prevented execution of a prisoner whose “mental state is 
so distorted by a mental illness” that he has no “rational 
understanding” of the reasons for execution precluded his 
execution.4  Alabama claimed Panetti did not apply because the 
prisoner here suffered from vascular dementia and not psychotic 
delusions as in Panetti.  The Supreme Court held that the Panetti 
analysis applies, regardless of the origin of the “mental 
1 Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 17-8151, slip op. at 5-8 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2019); see 
also Baze v. Rees, 553, U.S. 35 (2008); Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.Ct. 2726 
(2015). 
2 Bucklew, No. 17-8151, slip op. at 13 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2019).  
3 Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 17-8151, slip op. at 12 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2019) 
4 551 US. 930, 958-59 (2007).  
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shortfalls.”5  Thus, the Eight Amendment ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment may prohibit executing a prisoner who 
suffers from dementia or other cognitive disorders. 
NEW PRIME INC. V. OLIVEIRA, 6 
A trucker sued New Prime, Inc., a trucking company, alleging that 
it underpaid him by misclassifying him as an independent 
contractor.  He argued that, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration 
Act (“FAA”), the threshold question of arbitrability should be 
determined by a court, rather than an arbitrator, despite an 
arbitration clause in his contract with the trucking company.  He 
also argued that “contracts of employment,” referenced in Section 
1 of the FAA applies to independent contractor agreements.  The 
Court held that a court should determine the threshold question of 
arbitrability for disputes of certain transportation workers, and 
also that “contracts of employment” in FAA Section 1 includes 
independent contractors. 
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